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End the Moratorium: The Timor Gap
Treaty as a Model for The Complete
Resolution of the Western Gap in the
Gulf of Mexico
ABSTRACT

The United States and Mexico recently entered into a treaty
to delimit the continental shelf in the Gulf of Mexico, allowing
both countries access to explore and exploit valuable natural
resources in the Western Gulf. Included in the treaty is a tenyear moratorium on oil production within a buffer zone that
encompasses transboundaryreserves.
This Note explores the issues surrounding the buffer zone
and suggests a model to resolve the dispute over access to
transboundary reserves that will benefit both the United States
and Mexico. Part 11 describes the relevant international law
governing the Gulf of Mexico. Part III outlines the background
and most recent treaty addressing the Western Gap, and
explains the source of each country's claims to the area. PartIV
provides a model for resolution by detailing the history of the
Timor Gap and introducing the major provisions of the Timor
Gap Treaty. Finally, Part V recommends that the United States
and Mexico implement a similar joint development scheme,
using the Timor Gap Treaty as a model.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.

III.

INTRODU CTION ................................................................
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARD ............................
THE W ESTERN GAP .........................................................

A.

Backgroundand History of the Dispute.............
1.
2.

B.
C.
IV.

The U.S.
Western
Mexico's
W estern

Perspective on the
Gap Issue ....................
Perspective on the
Gap Issue ..................................

The Treaty with Mexico on the Delimitation
...................
of the Continental Shelf.
The Effects of the Western Gap Treaty ...............

THE TIMOR GAP TREATY AS A MODEL FOR JOINT
D EVELOPMENT ................................................................

926
929

931
932
934
935

938
941
942

926

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35:925

A.

V.

VI.

Background and History of the Timor
Gap D isp ute .........................................................
943
B.
Recent Developments-The Timor Sea
A greement ..........................................................
945
C.
The Timor Gap Treaty ........................................
946
D.
Effects of the Timor Gap Treaty .........................
948
APPLICATION OF THE TIMOR GAP TREATY TO
THE BUFFER ZONE MORATORIUM ...................................
949
A.
Application to a Privatized Oil Industry ...........
951
B.
Application to PEMEX ........................................
951
C ON CLUSION ..............................................................
952

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States faces a potential energy crisis. 1 Surging
gasoline, natural gas, and electricity prices have been identified as
"perhaps the greatest threat to future economic prosperity. ' 2
California has suffered power problems for several years as a result of
the deregulation of the state's electric utility industry, with rolling
3
blackouts required in some areas to ration limited power supplies.
Dependence on foreign oil has increased as well. 4 Politicians are
arguing over the proper solutions to the nation's perceived energy
problems, often engaging in public forum debates over who is
5
responsible and expressing outrage at the existence of the crisis.
Even in the 2000 presidential campaign candidates argued over the
ramifications of tapping into emergency reserves and the possibility
of oil exploration in the wildlife preserves of Alaska.6 Following the
election, President Bush immediately outlined a legislative proposal
that would open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil and gas
drilling to increase domestic supplies in response to California's
electricity crisis. 7 The general consensus is that the United States
needs more power, specifically oil and natural gas, and preferably
should get it from domestic sources.

1.
David Ivanovich, Energy bill draws threat of filibuster, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Feb. 27, 2001, at 1, availableat 2001 WL 3002295.
2.
Id. (quoting then-Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss).
3.
Id.
4.
William Dorzdiak, Energy Crisis Feared if Oil Prices Gyrate, WASH. POST
(Internet Edition), Nov. 21, 2000, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A46488-2000Nov2O.html.
5.
Id.
6.
Bush: California Crisis Shows Need for Alaska Oil, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan.
22, 2001, available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/politics/803106.
7.
Id.
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The United States has demonstrated an increasing dependence
on foreign oil in recent decades to satisfy its energy needs. 8 The
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) tightly
controls its production levels and, in turn, has substantial power to
set the global price of oil. 9 Senator Chuck Hagel declared that "[w]e
are more dependent on OPEC for our oil now than at any time in the
history of this country." 10 He sees increased domestic production as a
necessary step to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil." Domestic
consumption has increased, giving fluctuating prices the ability to
significantly impact the economy as a whole. 12 As the trade deficit
increases, energy consumption is expected to skyrocket. 13 Politicians
have called for a reduced reliance on Middle East oil, despite the fact
that it remains the cheapest available energy source. 14 They have
also called for increased exploration and production within U.S.
15
borders, hoping to decrease dependence on OPEC.
One possible area available to domestic producers is the deepwater areas of the Gulf of Mexico, which is believed to hold the fourth
largest oil reserve in the world. 16
The Gulf of Mexico is
approximately 3.9 million square miles and accounts for roughly
ninety percent of U.S. offshore oil and gas production. 17 Although
domestic oil companies have long explored the shallower depths of the

8.
Dorzdiak, supra note 4.
9.
Markets & Policy: Capitol Hill, OIL & GAS NEWSL., July 1, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 10576927.
10.
Consideration of Pending Treaties: Hearing of Senate Foreign Relations
Comm., 106th Cong. 40 (2000) (statement of Sen. Chuck Hagel, Member, Senate
Foreign Relations Comm.).
11.
Id.
12.
Note the oil crisis in the early 1980s, as well as in 1998, when oil prices fell
to $10 a barrel, while current levels are over $30 a barrel. Dorzdiak, supra note 4. For
an excellent, detailed overview of the impact oil prices had on U.S. banking and
speculative lending in the 1970s and 1980s, see PHILLIP L. ZAIRE, BELLY UP: THE
COLLAPSE OF THE PENN SQUARE BANK (1985), which focuses on the Penn Square Bank
crisis and subsequent bank failures triggered by unstable oil prices and severely
speculative lending.
13.
Dorzdiak, supra note 4. Dorzdiak suggests that oil consumption will
increase worldwide from 76 million barrels per day today to 115 million barrels per day
in 2020, with demand doubling by 2030 and quadrupling by the end of the century. Id.
14.
Id. This recent development does not consider the argument to increase
efforts to reduce oil consumption in exchange for other sources of energy, as nuclear
power is still "taboo" in Western countries. Id.
15.
Note President Clinton's use of the emergency fuel reserve to attempt to
lower prices of heating oil in the northeastern United States. See Markets & Policy:
Capitol Hill, supra note 9.
16.
Suggestions to open areas of Alaska were met with strong environmental
and political opposition. Ivanovich, supra note 1. U.S. geologists believe that the area
could be the "world's 4th biggest oilfield." David B. Sheinbein, Delimitation of the
Western Gap Land in the Gulf of Mexico: A Need for Diplomatic Resolution, 6 TUL. J.
IN'L & CoMP. L. 583, 587 (1998).
17.
American Petroleum Institute, Energy and the Gulf of Mexico: The Petroleum
Industry in the Gulf ofMexico, availableat http://www.api.org/ehs/gulf/oldpage.htm.
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Gulf of Mexico, it has not been technologically or economically
feasible until recently to pursue oil and gas in the mineral-rich deep
waters of the Gulf.' 8 Furthermore, exploration of this area seems less
likely to ignite as much political and environmental heat as
development of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska has.
This Note addresses the area known as the "Western Gap," or
the "donut zone" or "donut hole," which lies approximately halfway
between the Yucatan Peninsula and the United States and considers
the potential for oil exploration and development of this area. 19 Parts
of the Western Gap are ten thousand feet deep and were not
accessible
until
major
production
companies
made
recent
technological advances. 20
Given this new technology, many U.S.
companies can now access the deep water-or least begin the
exploration process-if they follow rigid federal guidelines. 21 Until
June 2000, the Western Gap was located outside the boundaries of
the treaty between the United States and Mexico and was
22
functionally off-limits for diplomatic and scientific reasons.
In June 2000, the United States and Mexico entered into a treaty
that delimited the continental shelf in the Gulf of Mexico, including
the Western Gap. 23 The treaty includes all of the Western Gap, but
leaves unresolved a buffer zone that runs along the equidistant line
separating each country's portion of the Western Gap. 24 A ten-year
moratorium is in effect on the buffer zone to allow both sides to
determine the best way to divide the reserves that are believed to
exist along the actual equidistant line. 25 This Note offers a potential
resolution, beneficial to both the United States and Mexico, which
would result in an equitable sharing of buffer zone reserves. The
suggested solution is to create a zone of cooperation, allowing any and
all companies to bid on drilling within the zone. The United States
and Mexico would then share the royalties. 2 6 Such cooperation will

18.
19.

See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
Jim Kennett, U.S., Mexico agree on split of Gulf site with oil potential,
HOUSTON CHRON., June 3, 2000, at 1, available at 2000 WL 4302627.
20.
Gerald Karey, US-Mexico Treaty, Never Ratified, Becomes Key in Era of
Deepwater GOM, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, Mar. 20, 1997, at 1, available at 1997 WL
8877920.

21.
See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
22.
Kennett, supra note 19.
23.
U.S., Mexico Approve Gulf Oil Drilling Accord, CHICAGO TRIB., June 10,
2000, at 20.
24.

Id.

25.
Id.
26.
Mexico has an additional concern given its nationalized oil company.
Because PEMEX is the government, Mexico uses its oil reserves in its valuation of the
country as a whole. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Mexico Country Analysts
Brief, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/mexifull.html.
Simply sharing
royalties with the United States may have serious ramifications for the Mexican
economy.
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inevitably be affected by the Mexican Constitution's current
resources.2 7
of natural
on private ownership
prohibition
Nevertheless, this Note argues that the principles of the zone of
cooperation may still be applied.
A particularly good example of such a zone of cooperation is the
Timor Gap Treaty, a joint development regime that controls the
development of the deep boundary water in the Timor Sea. 28 The
Timor Gap Treaty has been successful, both originally between
Indonesia and Australia and as recently renegotiated between East
Timor and Australia, and serves as an important model for the
settlement of boundary disputes in international waters.
This Note suggests that a joint development scheme, similar to
the Timor Gap Treaty, presents a possible solution to the Western
Gap buffer zone moratorium. Part II briefly describes the relevant
applicable international law governing the Gulf of Mexico. Part III
analyzes the background and most recent agreement governing the
Western Gap and each country's claim to and interests in the area.
Part IV discusses the background and history of the Timor Gap and
introduces the major provisions of the Timor Gap Treaty. Finally,
Part V recommends that the United States and Mexico implement a
similar joint development scheme using the Timor Gap Treaty as a
model, while maintaining consideration for the issue of Mexico's
nationalized oil regime.

II. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARD
The Western Gap is considered part of the Continental shelf of
the Gulf of Mexico. 29 Because of its location, two international laws
The first is the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
may apply.
Continental Shelf, to which both the United States and Mexico are
Article 1 of the 1958 Convention provides that the
parties.3 0
continental shelf of a coastal state extends beyond the depth of two

See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
27.
Lian A. Mito, The Timor Gap Treaty as a Model for Joint Development in
28.
the Spratly Islands, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 727 (1998).
Jorge A. Vargas, The Gulf of Mexico: A Binational Lake Shared by the
29.
United States and Mexico, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 459, 464-65 (1996) (arguing that, based
on new scientific data, the Western Gap is actually part of the Continental Shelf rather
than deep water that would require a separate international law standard involving
the United Nations, essentially preventing bilateral resolution by the United States
and Mexico).
Letter of Submittal, U.S. Dept. of State, Washington D.C., July 5th, 2000,
30.
SEN. TREATY DOC. No. 106-39, available at 2000 U.S.T. LEXIS 60, *2 [hereinafter
Letter of Submittal].
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hundred meters where the depth of the superjacent waters admits
31
the exploitation of the natural resources of the shelf.
The second body of international law possibly applicable to the
continental shelf of the Gulf of Mexico is the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted by the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 32 to which Mexico
is a party.3 3 The United States, however, refused to sign UNCLOS in
1982 because it contained what the United States considered to be
"flaws in the regime it would have established for managing the
development of mineral resources of the seabed beyond national
jurisdiction. '3 4 President Reagan, while rejecting the Convention due
to its stance on seabed mining, expressly recognized that the balance
of interests achieved in the remaining parts of the Convention was in
the interests of the United States and the international community as
a whole.3 5 Thus, the United States accepts that UNCLOS reflects
customary international law in this respect and has acknowledged
that UNCLOS provides a more scientifically based definition of a
36
continental shelf.
Article 76 of the Convention provides that the continental shelf
of a coastal state comprises the greater of (1) the area in which the
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas extend beyond a country's
territorial sea througholit the "natural prolongation of its land
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin;" or (2) "the area
to a distance of two hundred nautical miles from the baselines from
which the territorial sea is measured. '3 7 Under either UNCLOS
measurement, the coastal state has exclusive control over the
exploration and exploitation of the natural resources, including oil
38
and gas, of the continental shelf.
With respect to the areas beyond two hundred nautical miles
from coastal baselines, the 1958 Geneva Convention and UNCLOS
provide that certain criteria must be met in order to qualify as a
continental shelf. Specifically, a coastal state can establish the shelf s
outer boundary to coincide with the outer edge of the continental

31.
Id.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature,
32.
Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. AIConf./62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 1.L.M. 1261.
33.
Letter of Submittal, supra note 30, at *6.
34.
Letter from the President to the Senate, Oct. 7, 1994, U.S. Dept. of State
Dispatch Supp., Feb. 1995, Vol. 6, No.1, reprintedin 34 I.L.M. 1396 (Sept. 1995).
35.
Bernard H. Oxman, Current Developments, United States Interests in the
Law of the Sea Convention, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 167, 168 (1994). He announced that the
United States would act in the future in a manner that was consistent with the balance
of U.S. interests with the rest of the Convention. Id.
36.
Letter of Submittal, supra note 30, at *5.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
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margin. 39 This requires that the outer edge of the continental margin
be physically located further than the two hundred nautical mile
limit. 40 This is an exceptional submarine geological formation that is
41
quite rare in the world.
While negotiating the treaty with Mexico on the Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf, both the United States and Mexico agreed that
all of the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas beyond the two
hundred mile exclusive economic zone limit in the Western Gulf of
Mexico met the legal requirements described in both the 1958 Geneva
Convention and UNCLOS concerning the continental shelf.42 This
determination prevented the area at issue from being considered part
of the "common heritage of mankind," held in trust for the people of
43
the world.

III. THE WESTERN GAP

The drawing by the United States and Mexico of the two
hundred nautical mile national territory formed the Western Gap,
which is roughly halfway between the Texas coastline and the
Yucatan Peninsula to the southeast. 44 The United States formed the
boundary following its coastline, while Mexico used its coastline as
well as small Mexican islands north of the Yucatan. 45 The result was
a gap of approximately 129 nautical miles created by the distance
between the opposing coasts: they are more than four hundred
nautical miles. apart and thus create a space between the respective

39.
Vargas, supra note 29, at 468.
40.
Id.
41.
Id. (noting that very few coastal states have reported such geological
formations to UNCLOS).
42.
Letter of Submittal, supra note 30, at *5-6.
43.
Dabney Welsh, Access to Our Backyard Reserves: A Final Resolution of the
Western Gulf of Mexico's Maritime Boundaries, 23 HouS. J. INT'L L. 609, 626-27 (2001)
(discussing the history of the UNCLOS and both the Mexican and U.S. interpretation
of UNCLOS). Had the area been classified as common heritage, it would not be subject
to exclusive regulation between the two countries. Id. Common heritage is not subject
to exclusive regulation between two countries. Id.
44.
Kennett, supra note 19.
45.
Vargas, supra note 29, at 464. While there was some debate concerning the
use of certain islands as the starting point of the EEZs, there was general consensus in
1976, but not official agreement until the 1997 ratification of the TMB. Id. The United
States did not object to Mexico's use of the islands north of the Yucatan because it used
islands in the Pacific for its own benefit and thus could not realistically oppose Mexico
on the issue. Mark B. Feldman & David Colson, The Maritime Boundaries of the
United States, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 729, 743 (1981).
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two hundred nautical mile exclusive economic zones. 4647 The total area
comprises approximately 5,092 nautical square miles.
A. Background and History of the Dispute
Despite the generally amicable relations between the United
States and Mexico, both sides historically approach boundary issues
delicately. 48 The boundary treatment dates back to the 1848 Treaty
of Guadalupe-Hidalgo following the Mexican-American War. 49 In the
war, Mexico ceded a large amount of territory to the United States,
50
including Texas and California as well as other western states. 5 1
Even in modern times, boundary issues have been contentious.
Additionally, both countries' motives diverged significantly with
respect to resolution of the Western Gap. As a result of these factors,
it continues to be important that both the United States and Mexico
maintain a perception of sociality between themselves to "heighten
their sense of long-term self-interest" and increase their efforts to
cooperate.52

Maritime boundary negotiations addressing significant portions
of the Gulf of Mexico began in 1976 after Mexico established its two
hundred nautical mile exclusive economic zone by amending Article
27 of its 1917 Constitution.5 3 Text inserted into the Mexican
Constitution provided that Mexico would exercise control over an
area situated outside the territorial seas and adjacent to them, under
the rights and sovereignty and the jurisdiction that the laws of the
Congress determined. 54 Any boundary conflicts or overlap with
zone would be resolved by
another country's exclusive economic
55
agreements with those countries.

46.

Feldman & Colson, supra note 45, at 743.

U.S. and Mexico Sign Treaty Creating Boundary on Continental Shelf in
47.
Gulf, FOSTER NAT. GAS REP., June 15, 2000, at 17, available at 2000 WL 8690245.
Feldman & Colson, supra note 45, at 743.
48.
49.
Id.
Id.
50.
One example is the issue of water rights in the Rio Grande Valley. James
51.
Pinkerton, Bitter Fruit: Valley Citrus Farmers Say Mexico Hoarding Water, Harming
Crops, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 30, 2001, at A29. Under a 1944 water-sharing treaty
that resulted in the construction of two reservoirs on the river, Mexico is required to
release water into its tributaries that feed the Rio Grande. Id. Since 1992, Mexico has
withheld 1.35 trillion acre-feet of water, citing drought conditions. Id. U.S. officials
and farmers claim that Mexico is, in fact, hoarding water for its own farmers,
demonstrated by the dramatic increase in Mexican agricultural exports since 1992. Id.
52.
Gary L. Scott et al., Success and Failure Components of Global
Environmental Cooperation: The Making of InternationalEnvironmental Law, 2 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 23, 58 (1995).

Vargas, supra note 29, at 462.
53.
Welsh, supra note 43, at 615 (quoting Article
54.
Constitution).
55.
Id.

27 of the Mexican
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While the United States deemed Mexico's demarcation as
generally consistent with its interests, diplomatic negotiations began
to establish their respective maritime boundaries where the zones
overlapped. 56 The line set forth was based on methodology from a
previous treaty that created a twelve nautical mile boundary, that
being a simplified equidistant line, with equal area tradeoffs, giving
full effect to islands.5 7 The agreement was incorporated into the
Treaty on Maritime Boundaries (TMB), which was signed on May 4,
1978.58
Although the TMB was signed by both countries and ratified by
Mexico in 1979, the U.S. Senate did not ratify the agreement until
1997. 59 While the Foreign Relations Committee reported favorably

on the TBM in August 1980, the Treaty was withdrawn from
consideration on the Senate floor on September 16, 1980 after
questions were raised about the potential for petroleum in the
continental shelf.60 Despite receiving a study of the resources by the
61
U.S. Geological Survey in 1981, no action was taken by the Senate.
The "[d]elimitation of the Western Gap became increasingly
important to U.S. interests as petroleum exploration has moved into
deeper waters. '62 One of the reasons that the U.S. Senate did not
take quicker action on the TMB was that the oil industry did not have
the capability to drill in 8,200 feet of water until the mid-1990s.

63

Private companies have been drilling in the Gulf of Mexico for many
decades, but generally only in the shallower areas of the continental
shelf.6 4

As technology improved with the advent of ultra-deep

drillships, artificial seabeds, and midwater completions,65 companies
66
pushed the frontier of exploration into deeper waters.

56.
Vargas, supranote 29, at 462.
57.
Feldman & Colson, supra note 45, at 743.
58.
Treaty on Maritime Boundaries, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 17 I.L.M. 1073
(1978); David B. Sheinbein, supra note 16, at 585. While Mexico ratified the treaty in
1978, the U.S. Senate did not do so until 1997, almost seventeen years later. Id.
Sheinbein claims that this failure by the U.S. Senate has contributed to the current

lack of resolution for the Western Gap given Mexico's ill will. Id.
59.

US, Mexico Advance Gulf Treaty Effort, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, Nov. 17,

1997, at 5, availableat 1997 WL 8881802.
60.
Feldman & Colson, supra note 45, at 745.
61.
US, Mexico Advance Gulf Treaty Effort, supra note 59.
62.
63.

Letter of Submittal, supra note 30, at *4.
Jerry Greenberg, Data Ready when Gap Close, Explorer (Oct. 2000),

availableat http://www.aapg.org/explorer/archives/1O00/westerngap.html.
64.
KATE VAN DYKE, FUNDAMENTALS OF PETROLEUM 74 (1997). The Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, as amended in 1978, governs offshore drilling
beyond the states' inland waters. Id.

65.
William Furlow, US, Mexico about to deal with the boundary "donut hole",
OFFSHORE, July 1997, at 60, availableat 1997 WL 10234914.
66.
U.S.-Mexico gulf treaty pressures rising, OIL & GAS J., May 12, 1997, at 34,
available at 1997 WL 9574810.
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As deepwater technology advanced, the TMB became an issue
once again.6 7 The Department of Interior urged ratification under
Mexico began pressuring for
pressure from the oil industry.6 8
ratification as well because of concerns that deepwater drilling near
the boundary threatened to drain off reserves that properly belonged
to Mexico.6 9 The late opposition leader, Mexico Senator Jose Angel
Conchello, popularized the "drinking straw" theory describing the
drain off concerns. 70 He suggested that if no agreement was reached,
foreign companies would simply drill in the U.S. side and "suck out"
Mexico's oil. 7 1 Coupling the U.S. oil industry pressure with Mexico's
refusal to begin negotiations on the Western Gap until the U.S.
Senate ratified the TMB through an exchange of notes, the Senate
finally ratified the Treaty and the two sides exchanged the
Instruments of Ratification on November 13, 1997.72 This agreement
paved the way for negotiations over the Western Gap.
1. The U.S. Perspective on the Western Gap Issue
The Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the Department of
the Interior manages U.S. natural gas, oil, and other mineral
resources on the Outer Continental Shelf and collects, accounts for,
and disburses the annual $4 billion in revenues from onshore and
offshore leases.73 As it pertains to this Note, the MMS is responsible
for Outer Continental Shelf leasing, production programs, and royalty
management. 74 Over the last few years, the MMS has offered royalty
deduction relief to increase drilling in waters deeper than eight
hundred meters. 75 While the Department of Interior has great
latitude to choose how to lease offshore lands, the standard lease sale
involves public notice of the proposed lease blocks followed by
competitive bidding that includes cash bonuses and royalty

67.

Id.

Id. Deepwater is defined as one thousand feet or deeper. Michael Davis,
68.
High interest in deep water, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 4, 2000, at 1, availableat 2000 WL
24501790.
69.
Nick Anderson, Mexico fears U.S. drillers will siphon off its oil, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Mar. 31, 1996, at 12. Despite the fact that the Shell Oil Company project
was more than twenty miles within the U.S. territorial waters, some Mexicans
protested that their sovereignty was at risk. Id.
70.
Ronald Buchanan, Mexico Sees Progress on Gulf 'Donut Hole" PLATT'S
OILGRAM NEWS, Mar. 8, 2000, at 2, availableat 2000 WL 14094053.
71.

Id.

72.
US, Mexico Advance Gulf Treaty Effort, supra note 59.
MMS Lauds U.S. and Mexico continental shelf boundary treaty agreement,
73.
M2 PRESSWIRE, June 14, 2000, available at 2000 WL 22276453.
74.
VAN DYKE, supra note 64, at 74.
75.
Gerald Karey, US details new deep Gulf royalty program,PLATT'S OILGRAM
NEWS. Nov. 30. 2000, at 1, available at 2000 WL 14098324.
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agreements with the U.S. government. 76 Deepwater leases last twice
77
as long as shallower leases-ten years versus five years in duration.
Foreign companies may participate in federal lease sales where
78
reciprocal agreements allow U.S. nationals to lease in that country.
The MMS pushed for the treaty in support of exploration and
development of this portion of the Gulf. 79 By resolving the boundary
dispute, the MMS could offer leases to private companies within the
Western Gap without risking Mexican protests, which could delay
development even further.80 Also, it should be noted that both the oil
industry and the U.S. government were probably aware that
Petr6leos Mexicanos (PEMEX), Mexico's state oil company, did not
have the technology or the funding to develop the Western Gap. It
does not seem unreasonable that the United States was at least
partially motivated by a desire to "get there first." Thus, the oil
companies and the government had great interest in the swift
resolution of the Western Gap issue.
2. Mexico's Perspective on the Western Gap Issue
Mexico's urgency to settle the dispute was essentially a defensive
tactic. While the United States stands to benefit immediately from
the delimitation of the Western Gap, Mexico is technologically behind
the U.S. petroleum industry by decades and needs to protect its own
Mexico has witnessed
reserves from private development. 8 '
successful deepwater drilling all around their boundaries by the
United States and Brazil, and fears it will be taken advantage of or
left out of the game. 8 2 Government officials and politicians in Mexico
viewed the delay in finalizing the border as an attempt to rob Mexico
of valuable resources.8 3 The director of PEMEX's Exploracion y
Produccion, Jose Antonio Ceballos, signaled his belief in the
importance of a boundary resolution by stating: "Make no mistake,
the overwhelming bulk of the hydrocarbon wealth is on the Mexican
side of the maritime boundary."8 4 Despite Mexico's new leadership

Id.
76.
77.
Id.
Id.
78.
79.
MMS, industry praise Gulf of Mexico treaty, ENERGY REP., June 26, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 8749077 [hereinafter Industry Praise].
While the MMS could have applied the treaty provisionally, it is clear that
80.
the ratification of the treaty legitimizes U.S. efforts to develop in the deepwater. Gulf
of Mexico western gap division agreed, exploration pending, OIL & GAS J., July 10,
2000, at 30, available at 2000 WL 14257607 [hereinafter ExplorationPending].
See U.S.-Mexico Gulf Treaty PressuresRising, supra note 66.
81.
82.
Peter Gall, Mexico, US on Brink of 'DoughnutHole' Deal, OIL DAILY, June
2, 2000, available at 2000 WL 23415903.
83.
Id.
Welsh, supra note 43, at 640 (quoting Ronald Buchanan, PEMEX Needs an
84.
Elephant Find: Gas Requirement Urgent, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, Apr. 21, 1999, at 2).
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and pledge for greater cooperation with the United States, President
Vicente Fox faces an uphill battle in further dealings with the
Western Gap buffer zone and potential transboundary reserves.8 5
Mexico is a country with a proud history, particularly with
respect to the Gulf that bears its name.
One commentator has
declared that "Mexico is a luminary in the constellation of States that
have
consistently
advocated
the
progressive
development,
86
codification, and strengthening of the international law of the sea."
Throughout the twentieth century, Mexico has been a leader in
implementing
new
international
law
models
in
its
own
Constitution. 87 It was the first country to establish a two hundred
nautical mile exclusive economic zone and to adjust its domestic
legislation to conform to the 1982 UNCLOS standards by enacting
the Federal Oceans Act in 1986.88
The Federal Oceans Act
systemized the previously piece-meal legislation.
The most
significant provision was Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution,
which grants direct ownership of any natural resources to the
Mexican government. 89
The Mexican oil industry was nationalized in 1938.90 PEMEX,
the state oil company, is the world's fifth largest oil company,. the
single most important entity in the Mexican economy, and a symbol
of Mexican sovereignty and independence. 91 PEMEX is the only oil
company allowed in the Mexican oil market, as the Constitution all
but prohibits foreign control of energy production. 92 It enjoys a
monopoly over exploration and production of all hydrocarbons-all of
93
which are owned by the state.
This circumstance affects the ability of the United States and
Mexico to create a joint development scheme in the Western Gap
buffer zone.
Foreign investment in production of Mexico's
constitutional reserves will only be possible if the Mexican Congress

85.
John King, Bush, Fox Pledge Greater Cooperation Between U.S., Mexico
(Feb. 16, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2OOl/ALLPOLITICS/O2/16bush.mexico.02/
index.html.
86.
Jorge A. Vargas, Mexico's Legal Regime Over Its Maine Spaces: A Proposal
for the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Deepest Part of the Gulf of Mexico,
26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 189, 238 (1995).
87.
Id. at 192.
88.
Id. at 192-93.
89.
Id. at 194-95.
90.
Embassy.org, Mexico, available at http://www.countrywatch.com/files/114/
em-topic.asp?TP=ENERG&COUNTRY= 114.
91.
Id.
92.
Tim Weiner, Bush Goes to Mexico Seeking Power: Electricity, Oil and
Natural Gas, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 13, 2001, available at http://www.iht.com/
articles/10605.html.
93.
U.S. Dept. of Energy, An Energy Overview of Mexico, available at
http://www.fe.doe.gov/international/mexiover.html.
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allows a mix of public ownership and private development in energy
94
production.
Although the state-run organization has enthusiastic public
support from those who see PEMEX as a symbol of sovereignty,
President Fox campaigned on a promise to "renationalize" PEMEX by
allowing oilfield professionals to run the operations, rather than
politicians. 95 President Fox, however, has backed off his efforts to
privatize PEMEX and plans instead to focus on modernizing and
streamlining the oil giant. 9 6 Although it raised twenty-two billion
dollars in 1999-thirty-one percent of Mexico's federal incomePEMEX will have to invest billions to keep up with domestic demand
97
for gasoline and natural gas for commercial and industrial use.
Mexico's imports of natural gas from the United States are likely to
reach seventeen billion dollars per year this decade, 98 and,
remarkably, natural gas is the most liberalized of the energy
sectors. 99 While the natural gas sector is partly privatized, it remains
tied to PEMEX's actions because the oil monopoly maintains
exclusive rights for the extraction and sale of natural gas.100
Other energy sectors, such as oil and gas refineries and
electricity, have experienced partial privatization in the 1990s as
well. 1 1 The question remains, however, whether the Mexican
government will part with its monopoly and point of pride. While
Mexican politicians have held steadfast, it may not be economically
efficient or even viable to try -to streamline from within the
company. 10 2 With the Mexican economy suffering and its balance of
payments equally poor, the hard-liners should consider the principle
of discounted present value and open the doors for private
investment. Having a joint interest today is worth far more than
having it all twenty years from now when PEMEX is finally capable
of extracting the reserves itself.
Mexico remains sensitive to any hint of U.S. interference in their
country, and one of the main arguments against selling off PEMEX is
that it would likely hand control of sovereign resources over to U.S.

94.
Id.
The Upturn Continues, WORLD OIL, Aug. 1, 2000, at 37, available at 2000
95.
WL 18974359.
96.
Embassy.org, supra note 90.
Weiner, supra note 92.
97.
98.
Id.
99.
United States Energy Information Administration, Mexico (Feb. 2000), at
In 1995 the Mexican Congress
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/mexifull.html.
approved the Natural Gas Law, modifying the Mexican Constitution, opening the
natural gas market to private and foreign investors. Id.
100.
Id.
Id.
101.
102.
See generally Weiner, supra note 92.
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companies. 10 3
However, the benefits of privatization, 10 4 such as
improved growth of the national gross product and substantial
10 5
private investment, should force Mexico to reconsider its stance.
Admittedly the process is politically difficult, but the long-term
benefits in the face of staggering costs to overhaul the current system
10 6
without private investment should outweigh the political expense.
Even if full privatization is not possible, the Timor Gap Treaty
principles may be successfully applied to the buffer zone of the
10 7
Western Gap.
B. The Treaty with Mexico on the Delimitation of the Continental
Shelf
In November 1997, the U.S. Senate ratified the 1978 treaty with
Mexico settling the maritime boundary between the United States
and Mexico.' 08
That ratification paved the way for subsequent
negotiations to determine the boundary in the Western Gap.' 0 9
The result of Western Gap negotiations was officially named the
"Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the United Mexican States on the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Western Gulf of Mexico
Beyond 200 Nautical Miles,"110 signed by Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright and Mexico's Foreign Minister Rosario Green on
June 9, 2000.111 The accord gave the United States 1,913 square
nautical miles, about thirty-eight percent of the total, while Mexico
received 3,179 square nautical miles, approximately sixty-two percent

103.

Mexico, U.S. May Solve Gulf Quarrel;Possible Oil Field Split Between Two

Nations, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 3, 2000, at C3,available at 2000 WL 21261710.

104.
Chile, Argentina, and Brazil exemplify the positives of natural resource
privatization. J. Keith Russell, The Time is Now for the Full Privatizationof PEMEX,
20 Hous. J. INT'LL. 173, 176-79 (1997).
105. Id. at 176-77.
106.
See Weiner, supra note 92 (noting that private investors rarely sink money
into state-controlled enterprises).
107. If PEMEX remained nationalized, the scope of the joint development plan
would be modified slightly. See infra notes 139-42, 229-33 and accompanying text.
108.
Karey, supra note 20.
109.
US, Mexico Advance Gulf Treaty Effort, supra note 59. Mexico had made it
clear that it was not willing to discuss the Western Gap until the U.S. Senate ratified
the TMB. Id.
110. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Mexican States on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
in the Western Gulf of Mexico Beyond 200 Nautical Miles, June 9, 2000, U.S.-Mex., S.
TREATY DOC. No. 106-39 (2000) [hereinafter Western Gap Treaty].
111.
Bob Deans, Agreement on Border Runs Deep; U.S., Mexico Settle Ownership
of Sea Bottom That's Apparently Rich in Energy Resources, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June
10, 2000, at 11A.
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of the total. 112 The accord further employed an equidistance method
as the basis for the demarcation of clear borders, as suggested by the
U.S. State Department. 113 This equidistance method is consistent
114
with previous U.S. treaties.
The Western Gap Treaty also established a small 1.4 nautical
mile buffer zone on each side of the new boundary, to which a tenyear moratorium on oil and gas exploration and production would
apply. 115 The size of the buffer zone was statistically calculated to
encompass more than ninety-nine percent of the potential
transboundary reserves. 116 After the ten-year period, each country
could permit exploration and drilling of oil and gas in its respective
1 17
buffer zone.
It is apparent that the buffer zone moratorium was created
"mainly to allay Mexican nervousness that U.S. companies, who
likely will be ready to produce reservoirs earlier that PEMEX, might
drain oil or gas from the Mexican side of the boundary." 118 This
enabled Mexico to pass the Western Gap Treaty quickly without
opposition from their Senate, whose Members have strongly
denounced any efforts by the United States to drill anywhere near the
boundary. 1 19 Additionally, the delay "will allow Mexico to form a
better idea about the nature and location of the cross-border
reserves." 120
While both countries encourage exploration and
analysis work during the ten-year period and must share any
exploration information with each other, 121 the larger issue of
developing the transboundary reserves remains unresolved.
In addition to defining the area governed by the treaty
specifically, the preamble acknowledges the purpose of the
delimitation, "[t]aking into account the possibility that there could
exist petroleum or natural gas reservoirs that extend across that
continental shelf boundary, and the need for cooperation and periodic
consultation between the parties in protecting their respective
interests in such circumstances."' 1 22 Article I lists the coordinates of

112.
Jerry Greenberg, Data Ready when Gap Close, EXPLORER (Oct. 2000), at
http://www.aapg.org/explorer/archives/l _00/western-gap.html.
113.
Welsh, supra note 43, at 649.
114.
Examples include the Cuba-Bahamas boundary, the U.S. and British
Virgin Islands boundary, the Cook Islands and New Zealand boundary, and the U.S.
and Canadian boundary. See id. at 635-39.
115.
Id. at 651-52.
116.
Welsh, supra note 43, at 652; ExplorationPending,supra note 80.
117.
Industry Praise,supra note 79.
118.
ExplorationPending,supra note 80.
119.
Id. Mexico fears that without this buffer zone, the advanced U.S. oil
companies would drill as close as possible to the boundary and take reserves from the
Mexican side that rightfully belong to Mexico. See id.
120.
Kennett, supra note 19 (quoting a statement by the Mexican government).
121.
Id.
122.
Western Gap Treaty, supra note 110, at 1.
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the boundaries, 123 while Article II states the computational bases for
the coordinates. 124 Article III prohibits both the United States and
Mexico from claiming or exercising sovereign rights or jurisdiction
125
over the seabed and subsoil of the Western Gap.

Article IV sets forth the moratorium at issue in this Note.
Specifically, it provides:
Due to the possible existence of petroleum or natural gas
reservoirs that may extend across the boundary set forth in
Article I (hereinafter referred to as "transboundary reservoirs"),
the Parties, during a period that will end ten (10) years following
the entry into force of this Treaty, shall not authorize or permit
petroleum or natural gas drilling or exploitation of the
continental shelf within one and four-tenths (1.4) nautical miles
of the boundary set forth in Article I. (This two and eight-tenths
(2.8) nautical mile area hereinafter shall be referred to as "the
126
Area.")

1.

Article IV then provides that the ten-year period may be modified by
mutual agreement. 2 7 Additionally, Article IV requires each country
to allow the other to conduct geological and geophysical surveys on its
side of the Area to help determine the possible presence and
distribution of transboundary reservoirs. 128 Furthermore, the United
States and Mexico must share geological and geophysical information

123.
The continental shelf boundary between the United States of America and
the United Mexican States in the Western Gulf of Mexico beyond 200 nautical miles
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured shall be
determined by geodetic lines connecting the following coordinates:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Id. at 2.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.

25 [degrees]
25 [degrees]
25 [degrees]
25 [degrees]
25 [degrees]
25 [degrees]
25 [degrees]
25 [degrees]
25 [degrees]
25 [degrees]
25 [degrees]
25 [degrees]
25 [degrees]
25 [degrees]
25 [degrees]
25 [degrees]

42' 14.1" N.
39' 43.1" N.
36' 46.2" N.
37' 01.2" N.
37' 50.7" N.
38' 13.4" N.
39' 22.3" N.
39' 23.8" N.
40' 03.2" N.
40' 27.3" N.
42' 37.2" N.
46' 33.9" N.
48' 45.2" N.
51' 51.0" N.
54' 27.4" N.
59' 49.3" N.

91
91
91
91
92
92
92
92
92
92
92
92
93
93
93
93

[degrees]
[degrees]
[degrees]
[degrees]
[degrees]
[degrees]
[degrees]
[degrees]
[degrees]
[degrees]
[degrees]
[degrees]
[degrees]
[degrees]
[degrees]
[degrees]

05'25.0" W.
20' 31.2" W.
39' 29.4" W.
44' 19.1" W.
00' 35.5" W.
07' 59.3" W.
31' 40.4" W.
32' 13.7" W.
46' 44.8" W.
55' 56.0" W.
57' 16.0" W.
59' 41.5" W.
03' 58.9" W.
10' 03.0" W.
15' 09.9" W.
26' 42.5" W.
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in their possession and notify one another of any possible
129
transboundary reservoir.
Article V sets forth periodic meetings to facilitate the sharing of
information and, more importantly, to "seek to reach agreement for
the efficient and equitable exploitation of such transboundary
reservoirs." 130 Both parties must inform the other of any licensing or
concession grants or production commencement under Article V,'"'
and are also individually responsible for the observation of all terms
of the Treaty. 132 Article VI states that each party should consult the
other for Treaty interpretation, while Article VII disclaims any
prejudice by the Treaty, preserving independence in dealing with
internal waters or the high seas. 133 Article VIII requires that any
disputes be resolved by negotiations, while Article IX merely requires
134
ratification.
The Articles at issue are Articles IV and V, as they set forth the
sparse details of the moratorium while requiring efforts to seek an
"equitable" resolution of the buffer zone. 135 One possible equitable
resolution would be a joint development agreement such as the Timor
Gap Treaty.
C. The Effects of the Western Gap Treaty
The Western Gap Treaty successfully resolves a festering issue
and benefits both the United States and Mexico, at least in the short
term. The United States will benefit almost immediately through
lease sale of blocks located on the U.S. side of the boundary. 13 6 The
MMS has already begun offering deepwater Gulf lease sales pursuant
to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. 137 The MMS included as
many as fifty-three whole or partial blocks in the Western Gap in its
March 28, 2001 sale. 138 With an expected 1.53 to 4.39 trillion cubic

129.
Id.
130.
Id. at 4.
131.
Id.
Id.
132.
133.
Id. at 4-5.
134.
Id. at 5.
See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
135.
Keely Coghlan, MMS Expects Debut of Western Gap Leases to Attract
136.
Bidding Interest at Next Auction, OIL DAILY, Dec. 15, 2000, available at 2000 WL
30361443. As an illustration of the importance of the Gulf lease sales to the U.S.
Treasury, the three Western Gulf lease sales prior to the August 1997 sale yielded $1.7
billion in high bids. Ray Tyson, Gulf Donut Zone Might Be Hot in Upcoming Sale,
PLAT'rs OILGRAM NEWS, July 28, 1997. Since 1956, oil and gas production as a whole
has generated more than $100 billion for the U.S. Treasury. Id. (examining statistics
from MMS measuring from 1956 to 1995).
Outer Continental Shelf, Central Gulf of Mexico, Oil and Gas Lease Sale
137.
178, Part 1, 66 Fed. Reg. 11,524 (Feb. 23, 2001).
138.
Id.
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feet, and a net economic value of $1.2 billion to $3.6 billion contained
within blocks, both the oil industry and the United States will enjoy
39
substantial gains.'
The blocks or portions of blocks in the buffer zone, however, were
excluded from the sale. 140 Through implementation of a joint
development scheme such as suggested in this Note, the U.S. stands
to gain further if the buffer zone is available for leasing as well.
Mexico, conversely, protects its interests from possible
development by companies or consortiums of companies other than
PEMEX. Pirating concerns are alleviated, particularly in light of the
buffer zone. Another important benefit for Mexico is the free
14 1
information it receives as part of the Western Gap Treaty.
Although PEMEX has already carried out seismic studies in an effort
to establish the geological characteristics of the Western Gap, it is
unclear how detailed the research data actually is. 14 2 It is more
likely that private companies regulated by the MMS on the U.S. side
will do more intensive research, and such data will be available to
Mexico under the Treaty. Essentially, Mexico can wait for aggressive
U.S. companies to do the research for them.
Despite this apparent free ride, Mexico lacks any regulatory
power over exploration efforts under the current Treaty. 143 A joint
development scheme such as the one suggested in this Note would
afford Mexico an opportunity to oversee all efforts concerning the
buffer zone.
IV. THE TIMOR GAP TREATY AS A MODEL FOR JOINT DEVELOPMENT

On December 11, 1989, Australia and Indonesia entered into an
agreement establishing a provisional zone of cooperation for joint
development of seabed resources in the Timor Gap.' 4 4 The resulting

139.
MMS, INSIDE F.E.R.C.'s GAS MARKET REP., Dec. 22, 2000, at 21, available
at 2000 WL 13101150.
140.
Id.
141.
See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
142.
Ronald Buchanan, Gulf 'Donut Hole' Focus of Study by PEMEX, PLATT'S
OILGRAM NEWS, May 22, 1998, at 3, availableat 1998 WL 9828172.
143.
Even though there is a ten-year moratorium on oil and gas exploration and
production in the buffer area, each side can conduct its own seismic surveys and
prepare for possible exploration. Greenberg, supra note 63. Following the moratorium,
each side may permit drilling in its respective buffer zone, but must notify the other
when any of the buffer area is made available for drilling. Id. Under the current
scheme, Mexico would merely be informed of drilling on the U.S. side. Id.

144.

Michael Shane French-Merrill, The Role of the United Nations and

Recognition in Sovereignty Determinations: How Australia Breached Its International
Obligationsin Ratifying the Timor Gap Treaty, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 285, 288
(2000).
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Timor Gap Treaty resolved a lengthy dispute between the two
1 45
countries concerning seabed boundary delimitation.
A. Background and History of the Timor Gap Dispute
The Island of Timor, with an area of approximately seventy-five
thousand square miles, is located in the Indian Ocean roughly three
hundred miles northwest of Australia. 146 The island is divided into
two countries, East and West Timor. Yet despite their shared
geography, each country has a decidedly different history and
culture. 147 West Timor, once part of the Dutch East Indies, became
part of the Indonesian Republic following World War 11.148 The
eastern portion of the island, by contrast, was a Portuguese colony
until late 1975 when Indonesia invaded East Timor, incorporating it
into the Indonesian Republic as the twenty-seventh province on July
17, 1976.149
The Timor Gap was created in 1972 as the result of two events.
First, Australia and Indonesia enacted a treaty establishing a seabed
boundary in an area east of Papua New Guinea and south of West
Timor. 150 Australia was unsuccessful, however, in negotiating a
similar treaty with Portugal governing a seabed boundary between
itself and East Timor. 15 1 The success of one negotiation and the
failure of the other resulted in a gap in the seabed boundary between
East Timor and Australia. 152 Indonesia inherited the boundary
dispute when it took control of East Timor in 1975.153
In 1974, reports of petroleum discoveries in the Kelp structure
within the Timor Gap region revealed significant oil and gas

145.
146.

Id.
Mito, supra note 28, at 750.

147.

IAN ROWLAND, TIMOR: INCLUDING THE ISLANDS OF RoTI AND NAO 21-27

(1992).
Id. at 26.
148.
149.
Id. at 22-25; see also Stuart Kaye, The Timor Gap Treaty: Creative
Solutions and International Conflict, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 72, 75 (1994) (noting that in
1978, Australia granted de facto recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty over East
Timor, despite Australia's initial "unenthusiastic" protest); James K. Kenny, Comment,
Resolution III of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the
Timor Gap Treaty, 2 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 131, 134-35 (1993) (discussing that
Portugal and the United Nations condemned Indonesia's actions and recognized the
right of the Timorese to self-determination).
Ernst Willheim, Australia-Indonesia Sea-Bed Boundary Negotiations:
150.
Proposalsfor a Joint Development Zone in the "Timor Gap", 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 821,
822 (1989) (explaining the boundary dispute).
Id.
151.
Id.
152.
Julie M. Sforza, The Timor Gap Dispute: The Validity of the Timor Gap
153.
Treaty, Self-Determination, and Decolonization, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 481,
515 (1999).
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This potential for oil discovery made
production potential. 154
resolution of the Timor Gap issue vital for both Australia and
Successful oil recovery in the Gap could ensure
Indonesia. 5 5
Australia's energy independence into the twenty-first century, as
their reserves in other areas were dwindling. 156 Discovery of new
157
reserves was also vital for Indonesia, OPEC's only Asian member.
Due to the then-current rate of rising consumption and dwindling
reserves, Indonesia faced becoming a net importer of oil by 2001.158
Because oil companies avoid exploration in disputed territories, the
royalties could not be realized until a resolution was reached. Thus,
Australia and Indonesia began negotiations to establish a workable
159
boundary.
Australia claimed that the Timor Trough, a submarine trench
located approximately forty to seventy nautical miles from and
running parallel to the coast of Timor, was a natural boundary and
represented the outer edge of the Australian Continental Shelf's
natural prolongation. 160 Indonesia, alternatively, claimed that a
single continuous continental shelf separated Timor and Australia,
and therefore, a median line or equidistant method should be used to
delimit the boundary between the countries' opposite territorial sea
161
baselines.
When neither country seemed willing to concede or compromise
their respective positions, Australian officials suggested that the
negotiations concentrate on a joint development zone. 162 Despite
Indonesia's initial reluctance, Australia and Indonesia agreed in
principle to implement a joint development zone in October 1985.163
Although overall relations between the two countries deteriorated in
1986 and impeded further Timor Gap negotiations, 164 an agreement
was finally reached in 1988.165 On December 11, 1989, the Foreign
Ministers of Australia and Indonesia signed the Timor Gap Treaty
while flying over the newly created zone of cooperation in the Timor
Sea.

16 6

154.

Mito, supra note 28, at 751.

155.
GEORGE J. ADITJONDRO, IS OIL THICKER THAN BLOOD? A STUDY OF OIL
COMPANIES' INTERESTS AND WESTERN COMPLICITY IN INDONESIA'S ANNEXATION OF
EAST TIMOR 25 (1999).

156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.

159.

Mito, supra note 28, at 750.

160.
Willheim, supra note 150, at 822.
161.
Id.
Kaye, supra note 149, at 78 (stating that Australian officials first suggested
162.
the concept of a joint development zone in 1984).

163.

Id.

164.
165:
166.

Mito, supra note 28, at 753.
Id.
Id.
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B. Recent Developments-The Timor Sea Agreement
In August 1999, East Timor gained its freedom from Indonesian
control after a referendum produced an overwhelming mandate for
independence. 167 In October of the same year, Indonesia's legislature
revoked the annexation, paving the way for the establishment of a
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET).168 As a transitional authority, UNTAET instigated talks
between East Timor and Australia to find a more equitable way to
share the Timor Sea's wealth. 169 Many politicians and commentators
had argued for years that Indonesia's concessions to production
companies and Australia under the Timor Gap Treaty had been too
170
generous.
Australia and East Timor renegotiated the Timor Gap Treaty on
July 5, 2001.1 71 The new agreement changed little in the way of
structure of the joint administration of oil and gas development in the
Timor Sea, but essentially reapportioned the royalties in the Joint
Petroleum Development Area. 7 2 What had been a fifty-fifty split
between Australia and Indonesia was adjusted to a ninety-ten split in
favor of East Timor. i v3 The new arrangement is expected to provide a
minimum of four to five billion dollars in revenues to the fledgling
174
nation of East Timor.
For the purposes of this Note, the most important aspect of the
scheme-the Joint Authority overseeing the development in the zone
of cooperation-remains unchanged. It thus remains a viable model
for the Western Gap.

167.
Thalif Deen, East Timor on Track to Statehood, Say Officials, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, July 30, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 4804793.

168.

Id.

169.
170.

Timor's troubled waters, ECONOMIST, Dec. 2, 2000, at 44.
Id.

Ignoring Portugal's protests, Australia and Indonesia carved up the Timor
Sea's wealth evenly between them in a treaty they signed in 1989. The treaty
was deeply controversial in Australia and beyond, since it represented
Australia's acknowledgment of Indonesia's illegal occupation of East Timor,
never accepted by anyone else. The Suharto regime gave Australia far more
generous terms than they would have got under international law.

Id.
171.
Vandana Hari, Agreement Opens Way for Development of Timor Sea
Resources, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, July 6, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 13395624.
172.
Id.
173.
Christine Forster, Agreement Reached on Timor Gap Royalty, PLATT'S
OILGRAM NEWS, July 5, 2001, at 4, available at 2001 WL 13395703.
174.
Hari, supra note 171. Overall economic benefits to Australia, however, are
expected to far outweigh East Timor's gains, with a possible $25 billion in downstream
benefits going to Australia in the next two decades. Id.
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C. The Timor Gap Treaty
The Timor Gap Treaty (the Treaty) details the joint development
scheme of the Timor Gap. The Treaty's main purpose is to establish
the actual zone of cooperation in the Timor Gap for the joint
exploration and production of its natural resources. 175 The Treaty
covers approximately sixty thousand square kilometers and divides
the Timor Gap into three areas, labeled A, B, and C. 176 It will remain
in effect for at least forty years, or until the parties agree on a
77
permanent boundary.
The boundaries of each area reflect the maximum possible extent
of the countries' claims.' 7 8 The northernmost boundary of the entire
zone represents the maximum extent of Australia's continental shelf
claim, 179 while the southernmost boundary represents the maximum
possible extent of Indonesia's two hundred nautical mile exclusive
economic zone claim.' 80 The eastern and western boundaries are
comprised of simplified equidistant lines.18 1 The boundaries within
the entire zone itself reflect the claims of Indonesia, East Timor, and
Australia. 8 2 The boundary separating Area C, in the north, from
Area A, the central part of the zone, represents the fifteen hundred
meter isobath. 183 The boundary separating Areas A and B in the
south represents the median line between the two countries.1 8 4 East
Timor, under the new agreement, has successfully argued that it has
sole sovereignty over the majority of the oil and gas reserves in the
Zone of Cooperation A (ZOCA) once the sea boundaries were drawn

175.
Australia-Indonesia: Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area Between
the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia, Dec. 11, 1989, Austl.Indon., 29 I.L.M. 469 [hereinafter Timor Gap Treaty].
Id. art. 2.
176.
Id. art. 33.
177.
178.
Kaye, supra note 149, at 79.
179.
Id.
Note that the Zone of Cooperation is comprised only of the overlapping
180.
claims made by both Australia and Indonesia. Mito, supra note 28, at 753-54.
181.
Id. at 754.
182.
For a thorough explanation of the changes instituted by the New Timor Sea
Agreement, see the Memorandum of Understandingof Timor Sea Arrangement (July 5,
2001), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/specialMOUTSA.html
[hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding] signed at Dili on July 5, 2001 by
representatives from Australia and the East Timor Transitional Administration. For
purposes of easing discussion and because of the pertinent portions of the Treaty
remain unchanged, the Treaties will be referred to as a single agreement.
183.
Kaye, supra note 149, at 79.
184.
Id.
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mid-way between the two countries, 185 following international norms
86
under Article 83 of UNCLOS.'
8 7
Area B is subject to the sole jurisdiction of Australia.
Australia must notify East Timor of any petroleum operations 8 8 and
share sixteen percent of the tax revenue generated from the
petroleum in this area. 189
Area C is under East Timorese
jurisdiction. 190 East Timor, likewise, must notify Australia of any
petroleum operations in Area C191 and share ten percent of the tax
revenue. 192 Area A, the central portion of the zone, represents
overlapping territorial claims of Australia and East Timor and is
subject to joint control. 193 The proceeds generated from oil and gas
19 4
operations there are shared equally between the two countries.
Under the newly renegotiated Timor Sea Agreement, the royalties in
195
the ZOCA will be split ninety-ten in favor of East Timor.
In addition to defining the areas governed, the Treaty provides
for the creation of a Ministerial Council and a Joint Authority to
oversee the various rights and responsibilities involved in the
petroleum exploration in ZOCA. 196 The Council is composed of an
equal number of Ministers appointed from each country, 197 and meets
alternately in Australia or East Timor as often as necessary, or at
least once per year. 198 All decisions of the ministerial council are
made by consensus. 199 In addition to overseeing the Joint Authority,
the ministerial counsel also has the responsibility to make major
200
decisions and oversee all activities in Area A.
The Joint Authority consists of an equal number of Executive
Directors from each country, who are appointed by the Ministerial
Council. 201 As with the Ministerial Council, all of the decisions made
by the Joint Authority are also made by consensus.2 0 2 Ultimately,
the Joint Authority is responsible for managing petroleum

185.
Vandana Hari, Revenue Split of 85.15 Eyed for Timor Gap, PLATT'S
OILGRAM NEws, May 14, 2001, at 2, available at 2001 WL 13394859.
186.
Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 182 (explaining the
appropriate delimitation methods under UNCLOS); see also supra Part II.
187.
Timor Gap Treaty, supra note 175, art. 4(1).
188.
Id. art. 4(1)(a).
189.
Id. art. 4(1)(b).
190.
Id. art. 4(2).
191.
Id. art. 4(2)(a).
192.
Id. art. 4(2)(b).
193.
Id. art. 2(2)(a).
194.
Id. art. 2(2)(b).
195.
Forster, supra note 173.
196.
Timor Gap Treaty, supra note 175, arts. 5(1), 7(1).
197.
Id. art. 5(2).
198.
Id. arts. 5(3), 5(4).
199.
Id. art. 5(5).
200.
Id. art. 6.
201.
Id. art. 9(1)(a).
202.
Id. art. 7(4).
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exploration and exploitation activities in Area A. Other functions
include the awarding of Petroleum Sharing Contracts, the dividing of
Area A into contract blocks, and the collection and distribution of
203
proceeds.
20 4
The Treaty also provides a detailed Petroleum Mining Code
and a Model Petroleum Sharing Contract. 20 5 The Petroleum Mining
Code details the obligations and rights of the Joint Authority and the
petroleum contractors. 20 6 Under this Code, contractors have the right
to explore and extract oil while the Joint Authority retains ownership
of petroleum extracted until it is loaded into tankers. 20 7 The
petroleum is shared by the Joint Authority and contractor according
208
to a formula set forth in the Model Production Sharing Contract.
The Model Production Sharing Contract forms the basis for all
contracts entered into between the Joint Authority and the various
contractors. 20 9 In addition to providing the production sharing
formula, the Model Contract sets forth the standards governing the
relinquishment of petroleum blocks if oil discoveries are not made
2 10
within specified time periods.
D. Effects of the Timor Gap Treaty
"In addition to resolving a protracted territorial dispute, the
Timor Gap Treaty strengthened previously strained relations
between Australia and Indonesia."2 11 While several commentators
have referred to the Treaty as a "triumph of compromise" 212 and "an
boundary
deadlock in
approach to breaking
imaginative
214
negotiations," 2 13 the agreement has faced criticism on many levels.

203.
Id. art. 8.
204.
Id. ann. B.
205.
Id. ann. C.
Id. ann. B, art. 4.
206.
207.
Id. ann. B, arts. 4(3), 4(4).
208.
Id. ann. C, 7
209.
Id. ann. B, art. 5.
Id. ann. C, 3; Kaye, supra note 149, at 89.
210.
Mito, supra note 28, at 756.
211.
Kaye, supra note 149, at 95.
212.
213.
Mito, supra note 28, at 757.
214.
ADITJONDRO, supra note 155 (denouncing the agreement on several
grounds); Roger S. Clark, Timor Gap-The Legality of the Treaty on the Zone of
Cooperation in an Area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern
Australia, in EAST TIMOR AT THE CROSSROADS: THE FORGING OF A NATION 73-94 (Peter

Carey & G. Carter Bentley eds., 1995) (challenging the legality of the agreement
altogether). It is important to note that the scope of this Note does not address the
issues raised by many scholars concerning the political and social issues raised by the
Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975 and the subsequent dominance by Indonesia
and the legitimacy of the Timor Gap Treaty. Rather, this Note merely looks at the
mechanics of the agreement set forth to resolve the territorial dispute that had
prevented the exploration of the Timor Gap for petroleum. This Note does not include
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Opposition included individual legal actions challenging the Treaty's
validity. 215 Portugal immediately sued Australia in the International
Court of Justice for its failure to consider the right of selfdetermination of the East Timorese people, but ultimately lost due to
216
Indonesia's refusal to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court.
Another challenge was a suit brought in 1994 by three Timorese
activists seeking to have the Treaty nullified by the Australian High
218
Court. 217 In June 1995 Portugal contested the Treaty's validity.
219
These challenges, however, were not successful.
The new Timor Sea Agreement provides much needed tax
revenue for the "first nation of the new millennium." 220 In connection
with the Agreement, Australia has also agreed to give East Timor an
annual grant of eight million Australian dollars to assist with the
22 1
nation's resource development.
Since the signing of the Timor Gap Treaty, numerous productionsharing contracts have been approved, seismic surveys have been
made, wells have been drilled, and various global oil companies have
made several major oil disdoveries. 222 Because the Treaty has
successfully served its primary purpose and the settlement of a
permanent boundary in the near future is unlikely, the Timor Gap
Treaty is expected to continue in effect until a more lasting solution is
found. 223 East Timor is expected to work with existing arrangements,
companies already producing, and companies planning to produce
224
within the next few years.

V.

APPLICATION OF THE TIMOR GAP TREATY TO THE BUFFER ZONE

MORATORIUM

Despite significant differences in the factual backgrounds, the
Timor Gap Treaty serves as a workable model and source of ideas for

political discussion of Timor as it is only focused on the Treaty itself as a useful model
for governments of various countries facing boundary disputes in international waters.
215.

ADITJONDRO, supra note 155, at 34.

216.
Id.; Sonny Inbaraj, East Timor: Blood and Tears, in ASEAN 109-10 (1995).
217.
French-Merrill, supra note 144, at 289.
218.
Id.
219.
It is unlikely that additional challenges will be brought following the recent
independence of the East Timorese and the promise of tax revenue from the
renegotiated treaty. See generally supra note 174 and accompanying text.
220.
Deen, supra note 167 (quoting Sergio Viera de Mello, Special
Representative of the U.N. Secretary General).
221.
East Timor wins its just oil deal, WKLY. PETROLEUM ARGUS, July 9, 2001,
at 5, available at 2001 WL 23852683 [hereinafter East Timor Wins].
222.
Christine Forster, Phillips Reviewing Shell's Timor Scheme, PLATT'S
OILGRAM NEWS, Aug. 24, 2001, at 4, availableat 2001 WL 13396464.
223.
East Timor Wins, supra note 221.
224.
Forster, supra note 173.
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a solution to the unresolved buffer zone in the Western Gap. In fact,
the Timor Gap Treaty may be easier to apply to the Western Gap
than it was to the Timor Gap, given the absence of diplomatic
wrangling over the legitimacy of the claims. The political issues
between Indonesia and the East Timorese, including Australia's
contributions, are not present in the unresolved buffer zone. The
relationship between the United States and Mexico is positive and
cooperative, 225 and no actions such as those perpetrated by
Indonesia 226 are present.
Furthermore, under the compromised
interpretation of UNCLOS by the United States and Mexico, it is
highly unlikely that any other nation or international body will
227
successfully challenge the Western Gap Treaty.
A joint resolution would offer quicker access to valuable reserves,
while helping Mexico further develop its own Gulf resources.
A
royalty-sharing agreement would be even more beneficial and
arguably more equitable in light of demonstrated cooperation and the
scientific technology available to determine the location of reserves,
including ownership percentages of transboundary reserves. Almost
every well drilled in the Gulf has multiple investors to diversify the
risk involved. Each agreement details the percentages owned by each
party based on a variety of factors, but most noticeably capital
228
investment.
The Timor Gap Treaty outlines similar profit sharing, and the
new Timor Sea Joint Development Authority has employed the
229
principle of unitization to address transboundary reserve concerns.
If Mexico liberalizes its stance on PEMEX, it could benefit
tremendously from the current technology already being used by
multinational oil companies, receiving royalties without investing its
own capital. Obviously, the nationalized regime will not allow for
such profit sharing, but a joint development venture limited to the
transboundary reserves might afford the perfect opportunity for
20
Mexico to open up its petrochemical industry to private investors. 3
Given the current state of the Mexican Constitution, however, it is
essential to consider a joint development agreement in two scenarios:

225.
The recent visit by President Bush to Mexico to visit with Mexican
President Vicente Fox and discuss multiple areas of cooperation demonstrated a
possible trend towards an even closer relationship between the United States and
Mexico. King, supra note 85.
226.
See supra Part IV.
227.
Vargas, supra note 29, at 475.
228.
Unitization is the process of calculating the proportionate share of royalties
based on ownership interest in the project. VAN DYKE, supra note 64, at 62.
229.
Forster, supra note 222 (explaining the application of unitization to the
Greater Sunrise gas field on the basis that 20% of the field lies within the Joint
Petroleum Development Area and 80% within Australian jurisdiction).
230.
Weiner, supra note 92.
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one in which PEMEX remains nationalized, and one where private
companies can develop and explore on both sides of the buffer zone.
A. Application to a Privatized Oil Industry
If Mexico were to amend its Constitution to allow private
investment in its petroleum resources, the Joint Authority
established by the Timor Gap Treaty would apply exactly as defined
and practiced in the Timor Gap. Not only would the Joint Authority
have oversight power, it would actively control the development on
both sides of the buffer zone.
The Timor Gap Joint Authority operates essentially in the same
manner as the Department of Interior's MMS. That is, it regulates
all aspects of research and development and participates in the
royalty share.2 31 This would allow both the U.S. and Mexican
governments to benefit financially with an optimal return on a
nominal investment. By merely overseeing the development while
not actually participating in the exploration efforts, the governments
get paid through lease bids even if drilling is unsuccessful, as well as
It is a win-win
receiving royalties if exploration is successful.
situation for both nations.
B. Application to PEMEX
Even if PEMEX remains publicly owned, the Timor Gap model is
The joint development agreement would employ a joint
viable.
authority, similar to that established in the Timor Gap Treaty, to
oversee the petroleum exploration of transboundary reserves.
Essentially, the Authority would be comprised of an equal number of
representatives from the United States and Mexico who would use
seismic data to equitably divide the transboundary reserves on a
percentage basis. This process, called unitization, is done everyday
2 32
throughout the world in private joint development agreements.
This has been particularly successful in capitalistic markets and
2 33
other joint development agreements.
Because the Mexican Constitution prohibits any private party
from owning petroleum within Mexico's boundary, a joint authority
would admittedly be somewhat limited. Even so, Mexico faces no risk
by participating in such a joint authority. Mexico would have

Timor Gap Treaty, supra note 175.
231.
Single companies own very few exploration projects, most involve multiple
232.
parties as a way to diversify risk. VAN DYKE, supra note 64, at 70. Additionally, joint
operating agreements make expensive explorations possible because few individual
companies could attempt them alone. Id.
Unitization is a standard part of almost every lease agreement. Id. at 62233.
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guaranteed oversight over the development of transboundary
production. Again, having a share of joint development royalties
today is worth far more than having it all many years later, according
23 4
to basic discounted present value analysis.

VI. CONCLUSION
While the Timor Gap Treaty provides a model for joint
development, the potential impediment of Mexico's nationalized oil
monopoly is evident. Obviously, the Joint Authority envisioned would
have different duties depending on the constitutional status of
PEMEX; however, the model still provides an equitable result for the
unresolved buffer zone of the Western Gap of the Gulf of Mexico.
Either way, both countries benefit. The United States benefits
by getting quicker access to extremely valuable resources believed to
be present in the Western Gap. This is obviously important in light
of pressures to increase domestic production in the face of
increasingly depleted resources on-shore as well as offshore in the
shallower waters. Mexico has oversight of an area that many believe
to be exposed to the risk of pilfering by U.S. companies, and receives
an equity stake in a standard joint development scheme employed by
the oil industry on a daily basis. These benefits suggest that the
United States and Mexico should amend the current Western Gap
Treaty to adopt provisions establishing a joint development
agreement specifically modeled after the one provided in the Timor
Gap Treaty.
John Holmes*
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Particularly if the area is as resource rich as it is believed to be.
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